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Abstract
From the very early phases of design conception, designers use sketches as a
powerful design tool. Sketches are however ambiguous. Meanings are associated
on fly as the designer 'comes up' with certain ideas while working with it. There is
no hierarchy in a sketch. In fact 'structure' is established only after meanings are
applied to the sketch. However even in such structurally and conceptually fluid
territory, the designer solves most of his design problems and very often comes to
quick resolutions. To understand this fascinating tool and how the designer
interacts with it, we need to understand how we visually interpret sketches.
The process of design is also a reflective act. The designer keeps changing his
perspectives and focus based on the unexpected opportunities that emerge from
such reflection. Computational systems used today in design exploration are not
capable of doing so. On the contrary these systems model the world in a very
rigid structured way and cannot produce design ideas beyond what their preset
description anticipates. From this perspective there is no novelty, or surprise, in
such systems.
As a step forward, this thesis proposes the following:
1. Visual Schemas as procedural units of visual memory. They schematically store
real world knowledge ('courtyard') and form the basis for interpretation.
2. Separation of Shape and Visual Concepts. This thesis suggests that shapes are
flat and abstract collection of parts, while visual concepts are subjective and
hierarchic ideas, which are formed from the shapes through interpretation.
A LISP machine is presented as a basic computational framework for
implementing and establishing the model that is proposed. It observes a relatively
simple architectural sketch, interprets it reflectively through the activation of
potential, alternative contexts, and then gives a collection of concepts that it
manages to 'see' in the sketch.
Thesis Supervisor: Terry Knight
Title: Professor of Architecture
Thesis Reader: George Stiny
Title: Professor of Architecture
Thesis Reader: Patrick Henry Winston
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1. Introduction
As a kid, I used to enjoy scribbling sketches, without really having any idea
about what I was doing. After filling up a page, I would intently gaze at
them and within the intense confusion of the scribble, meaningful forms
would slowly appear and fascinate me.
Although distorted and incomplete, these forms - faces, animals, objects,
would fill me with a sense of discovery and make me gaze further at them
until these fanciful forms saturated my imagination.
I encountered such playful sketches, albeit in a much more sophisticated
and formal way, in George Stiny's Shape Grammar class at the beginning
of my masters program in MIT. He would draw a 'star' and show us how
one could see a chevron or an arrow inside it.
The 'chevron' and the 'arrow' were like the 'faces' in the scribbles. All of
them shared an interesting characteristic - they were emergent ideas, i.e.
they were not present in the actual drawing description of either the
scribble or the star, but appeared as we reflected on them and attached
meanings to different parts of it. The sketches thus became more than just
the structure that described them but were 'containers' of ideas. What was
fascinating further was how these different forms would remain merged
within each other. As I switchedfocus, the mouth of a face would become
the tail of the bird.
Therefore, along with the ability to contain multiple concepts concurrently,
there was additionally a multipliciy of semantics. Sketches thus allow designers
to switch from one 'way' of looking (interpretation of meaning and
structure) to another with ease and fluidity. This is possible because a
sketch has no innate structure. It is aflat collection of visual assertions. It is only
through interpretation that the structure of generated conceptions is
resolved in the mind of the designer. It is this non-hierarchic nature of a
sketch that allows ambiguity and multiplicity of semantics. Once hierarchy
is introduced, the world becomes monotonous and descriptions become
rigid. The parts of the face-concept could never become parts of the bird-
concept - topologically they are different altogether. If topological and
semantic variations were disallowed, exploration would reduce to
parametric variations only. This is the essentially the reason for the
'blindness' of current computational systems in use and limiting nature of
design exploration in such framework, where act of designing is more akin
to 'modeling' specific pre-configured semantics.
In addition, the act of 'reflection' is fundamental to the mechanism of
design [Schon 1987]. It is not always the final state but the interim states
during the process of design that are intriguing. There often 'emerge' new
possibilities that are not 'intended' or 'defined' in the system a priori.
Without a layer of reflection, it becomes nearly impossible to figure out
such emergence. Generative Systems such as Shape Grammars are
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concerned with the local rules, while the 'reflection' is more concerned
with larger and more holistic goals and principles of the design. In the
realm of design computation, contemporary systems do not facilitate this.
The act of 'reflection' would actually ride on the act of 'interpretation' and
a higher-order (meta-)reasoning structure that would interpret the
'interpretation' itself. Marvin Minsky in 'Society of Mind' says,
"There is one way for a mind to watch itself and still keep track of
what's happening. Divide the brain into two parts, A and B.
Connect the A-Brain's inputs and outputs to the real world - so it
can sense what happens there. But don't connect the B-brain to the
outer world at all; instead, connect it so that the A-brain is the B-
brain's world!" [Minsky 1985]
The idea of reflection and interpretation in design remains neglected in Proposed Framework
contemporary computational tools. Contemporary tools are essentially
used as drafting-aid or as a post-rationalization tool rather than for true
design exploration.
In order to build a design exploration tool, we must first understand how
we visually interpret abstractions like sketches and model a computational
framework that allows the following,
a) Simplicity (The sketch is easily extensible.)
b) Fluidity (There is no apriori declaration ofintent in a sketch.)
c) Ambiguity (There is multrglici of semantics and structure in a sketch.)
d) Context (Ambiguity is resolved using 'certain ways of thinking'about the world)
e) Interpretation (Association of real world concepts to Abstractions)
f) Reflection (Meta-Interpretation)
This is the motivation of this thesis.
2. Background - Revisiting some powerful ideas.
2.1 George Stiny's No Structure Computation
"The moment you represent a shape with structure you lose opportunities"
Stiny raises a very pertinent concern about information processing models
of computation. He criticizes the use of 'prefigured' structure and
semantics that are used to describe the world. These prefigured units or
definite 'parts' with specific features already known limits both observation
and subsequent action.
"Descriptions fix things in computation, and nothing is ever more
than its description anticipates explicitly. "[Stiny 1994]
The lure of creating computationally manageable representations, result in
unambiguous, rigid and monotonous definitions of the world. Since all
'representations' are fundamentally a surrogate for the described entity, not
embodying the real physical entity, the fragmentation and incompleteness
inherent in such representation schemes makes them almost synonymous
to constrained strategies of looking at the world. Such strategies are always
closely linked with certain task domains, which are concerned with only
certain aspects of the entity. In the realm of design, the designer in his
explorative mode flows from one representation to the other, switching
from one strategy to the other and the rigidity of a single logical structure
of representation is shattered. Present computational models fail to
capture the essence of 'ambiguity'. Computation thus is reduced to
'modeling' the information in a certain way rather than being a tool for
'exploring' novel ways to interpret the information.
"Whenever we treat a situation... [by] analyzing it in terms of
objects and their properties, we thereby create a blindness. Our
view is limited to what can be expressed in the terms we have
adopted ... A [computer program] by which formally defined tasks
can be performed with carefully designed representations ... does
not touch the problem of blindness. We accuse people of lacking
common sense precisely when some representation of the situation
has blinded them to a space of potentially relevant actions"
[Winograd and Flores 1987]
To remove such 'blindness' derived from the monotonous descriptions,
there has to be multiple conceptions of the world. This thesis suggests that
world is exactly 'what it is' and remains an unstructured collection of parts.
This collection is referred to as the 'abstraction space' in this thesis. It is
through interpretation that we derive 'descriptions' about it. These are the
concepts and they comprise the conception space. A single abstraction
space can give rise to several conception spaces. The computational
framework introduced in this thesis models a reasoning structure for
deriving concepts from the abstraction space.
2.2 Marvin Minsky's Distributed Cognition
"Unless you can represent an idea in many ways you don't have an idea"
Minsky's theory of distributed cognition [Minsky 1985] suggests that we
envision our mind (or brain) not as a unitary thing but as composed of
many partially autonomous "agents" - a society of smaller minds. Then any
'mental state' can be interpreted as subsets of the states of the parts of the
mind. Much like any human administrative organization, Minsky suggests
that there are large divisions of our mind which specialize in areas like
sensory processing, language, long-range planning etc; and within each
subdivision there are multitudes of sub-specialists or agents which embody
smaller elements of an individuals knowledge-base, skills and methods.
These agents embody small units of knowledge; recognize certain
configurations and respond by altering its (binary) state. Thus, the total
mental state is described by the states of all the selected 'active' agents.
Visual perception seen in this light can explain the concept of ambiguity in
shapes. After the first perceptive action of 'sensing' the world as a
collection of parts, the agencies react to it, each using their limited
rationality or reasoning structure, to change their states if required. To view
this theory from the perspective of this thesis, this reasoning structure
essentially encodes a schematic knowledge of some points of interest of the
Separation of the
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agents. If the points of interests are observed in the world, the agent
triggers and generates a 'concept' in this world.
To elucidate this theory, let us imagine a set of agents who have been
'exposed' to a world containing just Shape M.
Shape M
The corner agent finds corner ideas in the world and creates corner-
concepts. A
/ \
The direction agent finds direction ideas in the world and creates direction-
concepts.
The plane-agent finds a plane idea in the world and creates a planar-
concept.
At this stage, the shape is neither resolved as a collection of three line
concept nor as a single planar concept, but all the concepts are
simultaneously present.
Figure: Directional, Planar, Corner, Edge ideas are simultaneously present
Introduction of
Ambiguity
This captures the ambiguity of the world. Subsequent selection of sub-sets
of active agents creates a partial-mental state and allows us to imagine the
assertion as either three lines or a planar concept.
Real world concepts usually have multiple ways to think about them, and
their representations should reflect that. For example, idea of a chair-object
may have the following associations in our mind,
- 'Can sit on' (function)
- 'Has four legs' (structure)
- 'Stands of the floor' (relational)
In the framework modeled in this thesis, interpretation of a chair-object
would happen through a reasoning structure based on these associations.
"To solve really hard problems, we'll have to use several different
representations. This is because each particular kind of data
structure has its own virtues and deficiencies, and none by itself
would seem adequate for all the different functions involved with
what we call common sense." [Minsky 1985]
2.3 Pegor Papazian - Opportunism, Multiplicity of Semantics
and Exclusivity of Seeing
"Ourfocus keeps changing with every design move"
Papazian highlights a few important elements of the act of 'designing',
which provide pertinent background for the framework of this thesis. First,
designing is based on a substratum of opportunistic activity. At any given
time, the designer focuses on a limited number of components and
evaluative criteria. If a 'stimulus' in the evolving design artifact is important
enough for a given evaluative criterion, it will 'trigger' that criterion into
focus [Papazian 1991]. In the framework of this thesis, the 'stimulus' is the
collection of assertions from the world. Based on this collection a
reasoning structure generate concepts and assign them a strength-metric as
well i.e., there can be strong concepts as well as weak concepts. However,
in the context of the design, a weak concept can however be an interesting
one nonetheless. This translates to an 'opportunity' on the designer part to
emphasize and strengthen this concept.
Papazian also highlights the idea of 'Multiplicity of Semantics' in a design
document. The designer can interpret a sketch by attributing to its
components and their relations one of many sets of meanings.
0
Figure: Section of a Jug Figure: Plan of a Room
The figure above demonstrates an example of how the same abstract
representation can represent multiple concepts. Without the visual clues
(the thinner lines) there is no way a viewer can grasp the specific meaning.
In his book, 'Emotion Machine' Marvin Minsky suggests that to
appropriately interpret an abstract representation the author of the
abstraction and the viewer needs to share a common 'realm of thought'. If
no such agreement occurs between the author and the viewer, the viewer's
mind would keep switching between points of views using some rapid
machinery in his brain. According to Minsky, this is done by automatically
linking analogous aspects of each view to the same role in one larger-scale
structure. He calls it Panalogy (Parallel Analogy)
The figure below shows two possible 'realm of thought' for this graphic.
The 'Room Layout' Realm and the 'Mug' Realm. For example, a physical
wall might way be linked to the concept of a separator in a distant way ('the
Berlin walt: political realm). In essence, the schemas and concepts form of a
massive knowledge network. What the 'realm of thought' or context
enables us is to ignore 99.99% of our knowledge so that we can focus on
the 'task at hand' [Lenat 1998]
Figure: Realms of Thought
Exclusivity of Seeing
Alternating Illusion based on the classic vases-faces drawing, illustrates that
a given interpretation of an image cannot simultaneously be perceived as
one thing and another.
Figure: Vase-Face Ambiguity
Therefore during interpretation, there can be only one potential semantic
active in the designers mind at any given time i.e. there can be no
concurrent contexts in the interpretation cycle.
2.4 Shimon Ullman - Visual Routines and Spatial Reasoning
"There are elementary procedures that are assembledfor vision"
Creation of the 'abstraction space', i.e. description of the world as a
collection of assertions in elementary terms, is perhaps the first perceptual
step necessary for cognition. The visual system does this with remarkable
proficiency that cannot be mimicked at present by artificial computer
vision systems. Shimon Ullman proposes that visual analysis of shape
properties and spatial relationships is based on a set of elementary visual
routines [Ullman 1996]. He suggests that visual processing is divided into
two stages - First there is a viewer-centered computation of the 'base
representation' and second, the extraction of abstract spatial properties by
visual routines from such a base representation. It has been assumed that
visual routines are based on a set underlying elemental operations like shift,
bounded activation, boundary tracing, and marking.
However, an enquiry into visual routines for visual perception is beyond
the scope of this thesis and for simplicity, the proposed framework is
based on a simple and constrained user interface which allows only
orthogonal lines. To create a framework, which can observe the world,
create complex abstraction spaces before triggering interpretation cycles,
further work is required in the lines of Ullman [Jlman 1996] and Rao
[Rao 1998].
3. Theoretical Basis for the Model
3.1 Abstraction and Conception Spaces
Sketches are abstract representations. However, designers use them to
explore real world concepts. Thus, it is important to clarify between the
abstract and concept early on in the discussion.
The actual shapes that form the sketch physically comprise the abstraction
space, while the real world concepts that the abstractions trigger in the
designers mind make up the conception space. While a designer works on a
sketch, these two spaces interface and inform each other. Real world
concepts are learnt from spatial, visual and tactile experiences. Since most
people have different sets of experiences or memory, the conception space
is subjective and is different from person to person. Hence, it follows that
'seeing' or 'visual interpretation' is subjective and two people with two
different backgrounds might interpret completely different concepts in the
same abstraction space.
3.2 Assertions and Concepts
An assertion can be defined as 'any pattern that can be observed' in the
world. A visual assertion is a pattern or a shape that may be a collection of
points, lines, and planes. Additionally it might have other qualities of
patterns such as texture, gradient and even color. In this thesis, the line-
sketches are the shape-assertions that make up the world and are used
during the interpretation cycle to generate concepts. Concepts are imagined
ideas inferred from the world. They may or may not have any physical
existence in the actual assertions that generate it. For example the shape
below might generate an 'enclosure' concept that might not have any
geometric description at all.
ENCLOSURE
Square-concept which has a Enclosure-concept without a
Shape geometric description geometric description
Concepts have multiple representations and associations to rules and other
concepts. The representations can be geometric, functional, language-based
descriptions. In the process of design all these descriptions play an
important role as the designer switches back and forth from different ways
of conceptualizing in his explorative mood. For example, a designer might
start off from a geometric description and switch to other kinds of
descriptions and finally again return to a geometric description.
geometry -> closed-shape -> 'enclosure' -> 'dark' -> 'light' -> 'window' -> geometry
Each representation is like a mode of thinking about the concept and
within each mode there are associations to other concepts and action-rules.
A 'courtyard' concept may be represented as follows,
(Concept
(Tag courtyard)
(Geometry-mode
(properties (boundary-information) (aspect) (closure) (edges) (corner) (ends))
(associations (enclosure))
(action-rules (define-center) (define-corners) (divide-into-parts)))
(Functional-mode
(properties (gathering-place) (allows-light) (allows-wind))
(associations (ampitheatres))
(action-rules (add-fountain) (create-shades)))
(Relational-mode
(properties (next-to-buildings) (has-entrance))
(associations (pathways)(sky))
(action-rules (create-transitions)))
(Strength 1))
Concepts also have a metric of strength associated with them. This metric
is assigned by the reasoning structure, which 'makes' the concept, and it
refers to how close the actual assertions map on to the logic of the
reasoning structure.
IF THEN
Figure: Action-Rules associated are associated with Visual Concepts
Visual concepts have visual rules attached with them in memory. Whenever
a visual concept is triggered in the mind of a designer, the associated rules
are the possible forward moves the designer can use in the next step of
design. Therefore, in that sense the concepts drive the design moves. At
every step when the abstractions trigger multiple concepts, the designer
chooses the most opportunistic one (aligned with more holistic design
goals) to drive the design generation. This is the Principle of Opportunism
in Design and has been well elaborated in Pegor Papazian's PhD thesis
[Papazian 1991].
3.3 Shapes
Shape A
Shapes are collections of 'visual assertions' that generate concepts in our
mind. A shape has no inherent hierarchical geometric structure associated
with it and can be conceived as a 'flat' collection of parts. The visual
concepts, which are generated after interpretation however have
hierarchical structures, associated with them. In essence, interpretation is
what gives structure to the world. Philosophically the interpreter or the
observer gives meaning to the world and essentially is the author of it.
Interpretation I
ot2
Shape A
Concept1
- Concept2
Concept3
Interpretation 2
Concept2
Concept1
Shape A
Concept2
Figure: Two possible interpretations of Shape A. Notice their conceptual
and topological difference.
3.4 Schema
During Interpretation, generation of concepts from shapes, involves a
deduction system; at the core of it lay reasoning structures called schemas.
Shapes can trigger Schemas and Schemas in turn generate concepts.
Schemas essentially contain 'schematic' knowledge about concepts. When
the system' encounters the following visual assertion, the rectangle-schema
is triggered,
(If 'assertion
IS '(closed 1)
HAS '(edge edge edge edge)
HAS '(aspect (or 'wide 'tall))
Then MAKE-RECTANGLE-CONCEPT)
Visual Assertion Rectangle Schema
It should be noticed the Schema is independent of exact geometrical
structure of the assertion, i.e. is does not deal with exact metrics like vertex
information, rather its more concerned with the schematics like whether an
edge exists or not, whether it is tall or wide, whether it is closed or not etc.
From the cognitive perspective, during the process of 'seeing', visual
preprocessors [Ullman 1996] generate certain basic measures from the
assertion. These measures must be elemental and contain just-enough
information to trigger a large no of schemas, most of the time. This
argument is aligned with the Goldilocks Principle highlighted in [Ullman,
Vidal-Naquet and Sali 2002]. In the LISP machine, that I discuss later in
Chapter 5, 'directional ideas' and 'edge-ideas' are used elementary
measures. This independence from actual geometric structure allows
Schemas to generate concepts from even from weaker assertions, where
their actual geometric structure of the concept does not exist. For example
a rectangle concept can be generated from the following by a schema with
the 'closure' predicate is relaxed.
(If 'assertion
IS '(closed 0.5)
HAS '(edge edge edge edge)
HAS '(aspect (or 'wide 'tall))
Then MAKE-RECTANGLE-CONCEPT)
Visual Assertion Rectangle Schema
I 'System' refers to the LISP machine described in Chapter 5
The Schemas can be of different types,
a) Geometric
A courtyard has a boundary with three or more edges
L.I
The representation in the framework,
(courtyard) -> (enclosure) -> '(unsorted (edge,edge,edge,*))
The symbol '*' refers to a 'don't-care' condition i.e. an edge or no-edge both satisfy.
b) Relational
A courtyard cannot be next to another courtyard in the abstraction i.e. all
the rectangles in the figure below cannot be courtyards simultaneously,
The representation in the framework,
(courtyard) -> (not (next-to (courtyard)))
c) Logical
A courtyard cannot be inside a room. In the abstraction below if the bigger
rectangle is interpreted as a room, then the smaller one is not a courtyard.
The representation in the framework,
(courtyard) -> (not (inside (room)))
d) Functional
(courtyard) -> (gathering-place) -> (adjacent-to (many (building)))
(courtyard) ->(has-a fountain)
Schemas are learnt from real world interaction and experience. They are
used to schematically store our knowledge about the world. As shown
previously the schematic nature is independent of the exact geometric
structure of the world, since conceptually similar things might not share
exact geometry. Schemas however contain the logic of associating
geometric structure to generated concepts based on the abstractions in the
world.
Schemas can trigger other schemas within the context as well. For example,
a courtyard-schema might trigger entrances-schema or fountain-schema.
Therefore, Schemas also gives a structure to the entire conception space as
well.
PACADE 16 WINDOW
BUILDINGS -- 7 COLOR
GATHERING EN CES
PLAC>E
10
ROWD 10 PEOPLE
COURTYARD 1 I I NOISE
FOUNTAIN 12 WATER
13 NOISE
CENTE 14 SHADE
TREE 15 RADIUS
Figure: Hierarchic Conception Space
3.5 Active, Passive Assertions and the Imagined World
Figure: The active edge assertions 'activate' passive directional assertions
Active assertions are those assertions, which are physically present in the
shape. These assertions however 'activate' secondary 'passive' assertions.
For example, 'Edges' activate 'Direction-concepts'. In the framework of
the thesis, this collection of active and passive assertions in focus makes up
the 'Imagined World'. This imagined world is the basis for interpretation.
This is analogous to Paul Klee's Active, Medial and Passive elements in his
'Pedagogical Sketchbook' [Klee 1953].
3.6 Cognitive filter: Context
S-12 S-n".S-6S-1-1
S-4 S-5 1 ~9 -
,-- S-'-, S-2.S-1
S-8 S-1 S-8 S-3
CONTEXr - 1 S-10 -
Figure: Contexts are collection of schemas
Context is a cognitive filter, which selects a subset of schemas from the
entire pool of schemas in memory. Without context it becomes extremely
likely that large number of schemas will be triggered, diminishing the
chances of resolution2 . To allow for generality3 as well as coherence,
2 Having a single resolved interpretation of the abstraction
3 Different schemas refer to the same general set of elemental concepts for reasoning
Context filters are extremely important in this framework. In the LISP
machine, contexts are represented as a list of schemas
(Context
('Building 'Courtyard 'Alley 'Street 'Entrance 'trees... 'cul-de-sac)
(Strength 1))
For example, the 'site plan' context would select all the site-plan related
schemas (building, green, streets, trees, crossings etc). Therefore, when a
sketch is viewed in the context of 'site-plan', only schemas within that
context may be triggered. The same sketch when viewed in the context of a
'plumbing-fixture' would trigger different schemas. It is possible that two
different contexts have links to the same schema. This is especially true for
general or basic schemas. For example, a cross-schema might be triggered
by a road crossing in the site-plan context or by a pipe-junction in the
plumbing-fixture context. The contextual focus manager thus constrains us
to 'think in a certain way' and allows for quicker resolution of the meaning
of the sketch.
3.7 Perceptual filter: Focus
Figure: Focus
Focus is perceptual filter, which allows the selection of only a subset of
spatially related 'assertions' for the deduction system to work on during
interpretation. By reducing the number of assertions it reduces the
processing time for the deduction system, maintaining the smooth flow of
operation during a sketch exploration.
3.8 Memory and Persona
It is important to make explicit the role of memory in Visual
Interpretation. One of the core arguments of the thesis is the claim that 'To
See one must almost Know'. This is aligned with Semour Papert's argument
that to learn one must almost know already. From this argument it can be
further derived that our learing is incremental and every forward step is
reliant upon previous states. From the perspective of the computational
model, to see, i.e. forming a visual concept, one must have either a
corresponding schema or nearly corresponding schema in the memory. The
word 'nearly' is emphasized, because the idea of 'near-miss' is a learning
opportunity [Winston 1977] and it is important for otherwise nothing new
would ever be discovered.
The involvement of memory makes seeing a subjective act. Since schemas
in memory are learnt from experience, the same set of assertions in a
sketch might trigger different sets of schemas in different people, giving
rise to different interpretations. It is not difficult to understand in these
terms why an engineer would often see different things in a sketch than a
poet or an artist.
4. Visual Interpretation
4.1 The Model
Figure: Schematic Diagram for the Visual Interpretation Model
This thesis models Interpretation as successful triggering of schemas from
assertions within a context, to generate concepts. The reasoning structure
does the actual interpretation using the schemas in context and the
imagined world. Each schema contains a reasoning structure, which is used
to scan the imagined world in focus and ascertain whether a 'matching'
criterion is found. If there is a match between these assertions and the
reasoning structure of the schema, the schema is "triggered" and concepts
are generated. The knowledge required to create the concept from the
assertion is also embedded within the schema.
The generated concepts have multiple descriptions (the most prominent of
which in the context of this thesis is the geometric descriptions), action-
rules and associations embedded in them. The action-rules (draw-geomety-of
concept) might be used to add active assertions (shapes) to the abstraction
space (sketch), which is similar to a person drawing further on the
sketchpad or might be used to just add passive assertions to the imagined
world, which is similar to a person imagining ideas without actually
sketching it. This is how the collection of active and passive assertions in
the imagined world keeps incrementing with every cycle of interpretation
in this framework.
S E E MEMORY
CONCEPTS Reasoning Schemas
DO WORLD
Action-rules Sketch
Figure: Extended See-Do-See cycle for Interpretation
When the assertions partially match the predicates of a schema, a 'weak'
concept is generated. The strength of any concept is ascertained by the
logic of the schema. Therefore, over time the reasoning structure produces
a pool of 'weak' and 'strong' concepts in the conception space, which are
translated by the actions to become part of the imagined world for the next
interpretation cycle.
4.2 Finding Emergent Courtyards in a Site Plan
A) The Abstraction Space
Figure: The sketch is a collection of visual assertions. These assertions
make the abstraction space
B) Focus
11-
7Xr T--
Figure: Assertions in 'focus'
C) Passive Assertions
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Figure: Position Concepts
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Figure: Edge Concepts
D) Generation of the Imagined World (Overlap of Active and
Passive Assertions)
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Figure: Active Assertions
Figure: Active and Passive Assertions
E) Courtyard Schemas and the Reasoning Structure
The 'Site Plan' context is a collection of the schemas like,
(Buildings)
(Courtyard)
(Street)
(Footpath)
(Entrances)
(Trees)
(Parking)
(Cul-de-sacs)
Hence, visual interpretation of the sketch in the context of 'site plan' will
use the reasoning structures or heuristics embedded in this set of schemas.
These reasoning structures can be geometric, functional, relational or
logical. The following is an example of a courtyard schema,
(courtyard-schema) ->
(concept which-is-in 'world
which-is-not-inside 'figures
which-is-not 'too-wide 'too-long
which-has '(edge edge edge edge)
which-has '(edge edge edge)
which-is-not 'too-small)
F) Formation of the Courtyard Concepts
The schemas generate the following courtyard concepts.
Figure: Generated Courtyard Concepts
These concepts are added to the 'Imagined World', for the next cycle of
interpretation. By default, the concepts remain as 'passive' assertions.
G) Action-Rules
Further, action-rules embedded in the courtyard-concepts can be used to
add 'active assertions' to the abstraction space.
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Figure: Application of Action-Rules
5. LISP Machine
5.1 Principles
In this chapter I will introduce a computational framework called
TRIGGER. The framework allows the user to draw sketches using a
simple drawing interface. The sketch triggers interpretation cycles, based
on the model proposed in previous chapters. The salient principles of this
framework are the following:
A) The world in itself is flat, the conceptions about it are however
hierarchic.
The sketch is treated as a flat collection of visual assertions. Conceptually
this is one of the core differences between the framework proposed and
the contemporary computational systems in use. The flat-ness of the world
allows the framework to accommodate notions of 'multiplicity of
semantics' and 'emergence'.
B) Knowledge in seeing.
In this framework any interpretation requires schematic knowledge in
memory. 'Memory' comprise of a collection of schemas, which encode real
world knowledge. These form the basis for interpretation.
C) Conceptions space increments with interpretation.
In this framework Visual Interpretation has been modeled as a see-do-see
cycle. A recursive structure has been proposed which triggers schemas
every cycle and generating collection of concepts, which accumulate over
time.
D) Principle of exclusivity
In this framework there is only one context active in the working memory
of the machine at any point. This setup is based on the assumption that we
cannot have two separate active semantic ideas concurrently.
5.2 Parts
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Figure: The flowchart showing the main logical parts and the flow
of the LISP machine
A) World
In order to simplify and work with a small set of visual-routines,
TRIGGER allows the user to sketch using orthogonal lines only. The
initial sketch (collection of lines) is stored in a list. This list is termed as the
world
B) Perceptual Focus Manager
The perceptual focus manager selects a subset of the shape assertions in
the 'world'. To simulate gaze in a simple manner TRIGGER creates a
boundary of preset dimensions, randomly places it in the sketchpad and
selects the parts of the sketch, which are completely or partially inside the
imposed boundary.
C) Imagined World
TRIGGER applies a set of visual routines to extract passive assertions
from the initial sketch. These passive assertions are in fact the first
elemental concepts. These are elemental as no reasoning or interpretation is
required to generate them. The sketch gives rise to Edge-concepts,
Direction-concepts, Figure-Concepts, Position-Concepts. All of these
together make up the Imagined world
(WORLD
(CONCEPT (ST (((87 172) (87 76) (377 76) (377 172)) (232 124) (290 96))) (PR (145/48 0 NIL 4 TRUE)) (TG FIGURE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((88 296) (88 212) (165 212) (165 296)) (253/2 254) (77 84))) (PR (11/12 0 NIL 4 TRUE)) (TG FIGURE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((26 498) (169 498)) (195/2 498) ((26 498) (169 498)))) (PR (WIDE 0 (2 4) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((26 369) (26 498)) (26 867/2) ((26 369) (26 498)))) (PR (TALL 0 (1 3) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((169 369) (26 369)) (195/2 369) ((169 369) (26 369)))) (PR (WIDE 0 (2 4) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((169 498) (169 369)) (169 867/2) ((169 498) (169 369)))) (PR (TALL 0 (1 3) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((165296) (88 296)) (253/2 296) ((165 296) (88 296)))) (PR (WIDE 0 (2 4) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((380 202) (380 407)) (380 609/2) ((380 202) (380 407)))) (PR (TALL 0 (13) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((87 172) (87 76)) (87 124) ((87 172) (87 76)))) (PR (TALL 0 (1 3) 0 FALSE)) (TG EDGE) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((87 0) (87 1200)) (87 600) ((87 172) (87 76)))) (PR (TALL 2 (1 3) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((377 0) (377 1200)) (377 600) ((377 76) (377 172)))) (PR (TALL 2 (1 3) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((299 0) (299 1200)) (299 600) ((299 407) (299 202)))) (PR (TALL 2 (13) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((380 0) (380 1200)) (380 600) ((380 202) (380 407)))) (PR (TALL 2 (13) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((88 0) (88 1200)) (88 600) ((88 296) (88 212)))) (PR (TALL 2 (1 3) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((0 212) (1200 212)) (600 212) ((88 212) (165 212)))) (PR (WIDE 2 (2 4) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((0 296) (1200296)) (600 296) ((165 296) (88 296)))) (PR (WIDE 2 (2 4) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((0 369) (1200 369)) (600 369) ((169 369) (26 369)))) (PR (WIDE 2 (2 4) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
(CONCEPT (ST (((0 498) (1200 498)) (600 498) ((26 498) (169 498)))) (PR (WIDE 2 (2 4) 0 NIL)) (TG DIRECTION) (RL NIL))
D) Contextual Focus Manager
The contextual focus manager selects a subset of schemas available in
memory. It limits the ways TRIGGER can interpret the sketch. Contexts
are modeled as lists of related schemas. For example a site plan schema in
TRIGGER would be represented as
(context 'site-plan
('building 'courtyard 'alley 'street 'entrance 'trees... 'cul-de-sac)
(strength 1))
E) Schemas
TRIGGER collects information from the sketch to find possible concepts
using combinatorial procedures and then it filters out the ones, which do
not match the predicates of the schema. The following is a definition of a
schema which takes the entire 'world' (the sketch) as its input and then
generates 'L - concepts' if it finds any.
(defun trigger-L-schema (world)
(let* ((direction-concepts (extract-concepts world 'direction))
(el-as-direction-sets (match-pattern direction-concepts '(tall tall tall wide wide wide)))
(possible-el-structures (make-l-structure el-as-direction-sets direction-ideas))
(filtered-el-structures (aspect-el-check possible-el-structures))
(filtered-el-structures (filter-edge-value 3 filtered-el-structures world))
(filtered-el-structures (filter-not-contain figure filtered-el-structures world))
(el-list-set (make-el-concept filtered-el-structures 1))
)
el-list-set
Once the schemas generate concepts from the sketch they contain
methods to associate descriptions to the generated concepts as well. The
make-el-concept in the previous function is defined as follows,
(defun make-el-concept (el-st-list strength)
(mapcar #'(lambda(x) (list 'concept
(list 'st (list x (find-center (list (nth 2 x) (nth 5 x))) 'aspect-Ins))
(list 'pr '(nil nil nil 4 true))
(list 'tg 'el)
(list 'rl 'draw-to-sketchpad 'make-entrance)
(list 'sr (find-strength x))
(list 'assoc nil)))
el-st-list
)
)
F) Concepts
The concepts generated by the schemas are added to the imagined world by
default. At this point they exist for the next cycle of interpretation but are
not drawn to the sketchpad. They can potentially affect the cognitive filter
(contextual focus manager) - in terms of the framework, concepts can
have association with them and when they are generated, these associations
can trigger further contexts. These triggered contexts become active and
drive forward cycles of interpretation. Therefore generated concepts can
trigger a certain 'frame of mind' or 'way of thinking' during interpretation.
The interpretation cycle is modeled as a recursive function that triggers
schemas, generate concepts and extracts associations every cycle. The
following is the LISP function that is used,
(defun look-at (context world)
(cond ((eq context 'nil) nil)
(t
(cons (trigger-schema (first context) world)
(look-at (append (extract-associations (first context))
(rest context))
world)))
G) Action
The generated concepts have action-rules associated with them, which can
be triggered at this point. For instance a common action rule draw-concept-to-
sketchpad action-rule uses the geometric descriptions of the concepts to
draw them on to the sketchpad. This adds assertions to the world and such
assertions are considered in the next forward cycle of interpretation. This is
the 'do' part of the entire design cycle.
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5.3 Example runs
In the current version of TRIGGER, only a limited set of schemas is
implemented. The idea was to develop a simplistic model as a proof of
concept rather than building a tool with any real application in mind.
Sketch -1
In the interface TRIGGER lists out the concepts it generates and also gives visual hints
(dots) in the sketchpad to where it found them. The elemental concepts are shown in the
bottom left window (edges, directions and positions) of the interface.
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Figure: The interface of the TRIGGER program
VMS
Other than the elemental concepts of direction and position, TRIGGER generates the
following concepts,
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Figure: Concepts generated
If the sketch is further modified to the following,
I r
L
TRIGGER uses the schemas in memory to find the following concepts in the sketch.
Notice the multiplicity of semantics where part of an edge becomes a part of the rectangle
or a part of an L interchangeably.
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Figure: Concepts generated
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Sketch - 2
TRIGGER uses a simple Site-Plan context (Building-Schema, Courtyard-Schema and
Street-Schema) to interpret this sketch. The following concepts are generated. (Notice that
the courtyard and the streets are emergent ideas).
Overlapped Courtyard
Building Building
Street Street
40
Sketch -2 (extended)
The following concepts are generated (in the Site-Plan context),
Street
Courtyard Bu
Street Street
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Building BuildingBuilding
6. Discussion
6.1 TRIGGER as a design exploration tool
TRIGGER makes explicit a large set of possibilities from simple sketches.
Very often some of these possibilities can surprise the human designer and
provide interesting opportunities for exploration.
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It is interesting to note that the 'solution space' is not defined by the
abstraction space (or the sketch) but the memory of TRIGGER. This
model closely resembles the interaction between the designer and the
sketch, where the solution space is not really defined by the sketch but the
designer's mind.
6.2 Sketches with Performance Criteria
TED, I FOUND
CONTINUE...
A NARROW ALLEY. . DO YOU WANT TO
TRIGGER can be augmented with evaluation modules, which can
interrupt the designer when it finds 'failure' or 'bad' configurations. Also
the action-rules associated with the concepts can be used to automatically
drive design generation. The human designer can make use of this feature
to look-ahead into possible high-performance design moves. This is aligned
with Nicholas Negroponte's vision of the Architecture Machine.
[Negroponte 1970]
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TED, THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE COURTYARD AND THE
ENTRANCE IS MORE THAN 30 FI.. CONTINUE?
6.3 Shape Grammar Implementation
TRIGGER releases the dependence on structure; hence shape rules like
the one below does not require an exact structural match to trigger.
i . i -w
With an appropriate schema, TRIGGER can find the
the following three shape assertions,
cross-concept in all
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6.4 Schema Recognition and Pattern Recognition
There is a lure of comparing visual interpretation with pattern recognition
algorithms. While sketching designers can conceptualize beyond the
obvious geometry of the sketch. For example the concept of 'enclosure'
can be triggered from any of the following sketches,
-K -K
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Pattern recognizers would depend on strict structural comparison from a
pre-configured database. So to identify a concept, the database has to
contain all possible structures of the concept of enclosure. The Electronic
Cocktail Napkin project [Gross 1996] attempts to manage a drawing
archive using an indexed visual database. However to maintain generality
the database would be so large that it would be a serious limitation both in
terms of storage and retrieval. Though pattern recognizers are useful and in
some ways can emulate the effect of 'seeing', schema-recognition is more
efficient in visual interpretation, in the sense that it releases exact geometry
associated with instance and manages to encode class-information.
Schemas can be thought of as patterns in one level, but then the word
pattern is a global metaphor. Even our lives and our thoughts have pattern,
so to say. However the subtle differences are in the way we represent
knowledge and how we define our pattern. Knowledge in a typical 'pattern'
recognizer is just structural and geometric (meaning pixels will be matched
with pixels) while in 'schema' recognition knowledge is procedural
(deductions based on a set of visual assertions). Instead of a structural
comparison, a schema would treat a shape as visual assertions and through
reasoning generates concepts.
Interpretation via Schemas (Reasoning)
(edge-concepts) triggers -> (direction-concepts) triggers -> (closure-concepts) triggers -> (enclosure-concept)
Recognition via Pattern Matching (Searching)
database
instance
7. Contributions
In this thesis, I have
- Developed a working model of Visual Interpretation, which manages to
capture the notions of 'multiplicity of semantics' and 'ambiguity' in shapes.
- Identified some limitations of the current computation models that
constrain design exploration
- Described the key features of 'sketches' as a powerful design tool.
- Elaborated the necessity of non-hierarchic architectures for design
exploration.
- Developed the idea of Visual Schemas. They schematically store real
world knowledge and form the reasoning structure for visual
interpretation.
- Suggested the notion of a visual concept as separate from shapes and
developed a multi-modal representation scheme for it.
- Implemented a LISP machine, which can reflect on simple sketches and
form context-based conceptions. It can 'see' emergent ideas using
reasoning structures.
8. Conclusion
This thesis models 'see-ing' as reasoning structure based on combinatorial
algorithms. I do believe that there is some kind of reasoning structure in
our mind that allows us to both recognize what we see and attach higher-
level concepts to the visual assertions. However, at the end of this project,
I do question the dependency on the combinatorial algorithms for 'see-ing.
There is a combinatorial explosion of options even with relatively simple
collection of visual assertions. With the ease with which we 'see' I feel in
addition to the cognitive and perceptual filters that I proposed there must
be some other heuristics involved in the process as well. I believe that the
dependency on combinatorial algorithms has its roots in the symbolic
representations that we use and an inquiry into the basic representation
systems is necessary at this juncture. Stephen Larson's thesis on intrinsic
representations [Larson 2003] is a promising work and shows a possible
direction forward.
In this thesis, I have hard-coded the 'memory' (collection of schemas) of
the system to work within the limited time frame. However, this model
remains incomplete without an augmented learning system. Ideally the
system should be able to generate 'schemas' automatically by interacting
with the user. Such a learning interface is by no means a trivial extension
and requires a substantial amount of research and enquiry.
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